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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Complainant/Appellee, Vicky Ann McCord ("McCord"), pursuant to Rule 24(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following brief. McCord concurs that 
if this Court finds that Appellant Maverik Country Stores, Inc.'s ("Maverik") requests for 
review were timely filed, jurisdiction exists under the statutes cited by Maverik for this 
appeal (Docket No. 920206-CA) only. Note, however, that this acknowledgement does not 
in any way waive McCord's argument that the appeal docketed as No. 910413-CA should be 
dismissed because, at the time of the initial Petition for Review of the Administrative Order, 
the Administrative Law Judge's ("AU") June 26, 1991 Order was not final and Maverik had 
not exhausted its administrative remedies. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
It is important to focus on the applicable standard of review because Maverik, in its 
four initial issues presented for review, has apparently tried to frame some of its arguments as 
alleged legal questions as opposed to factual questions. The court will note that Maverik, 
while only listing four arguments in its issues section, strays far from the original issues 
presented for review and focuses on factual questions as well. 
Because these proceedings were commenced after January 1, 1988, the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989) governs. 
This Court has repeatedly set forth the standards of review under UAPA. "[Findings of fact 
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will be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the 
whole record before the court.'" Stewart v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (quoting Merriam v. Board of Review. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
This Court has defined "substantial evidence" as that which a reasonable person "might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion." Merriam. 812 P.2d at 450. Questions concerning the 
applications of facts to the statutes in circumstances where the agency is given discretion 
because of legislative intent or because of the Agency's expertise will not be overturned 
unless it is unreasonable; and only interpretation of statutes for pure questions of law in 
situations where the Agency has not been given discretion are reviewed using the correction-
of-error standard. Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 
581, 588-89 (Utah 1991); Tasters Ltd. v. Department of Employment Sec. 819 P.2d 361, 
364-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Wurst v. Department of Employment Sec. 818 P.2d 1036, 
1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Maverik has stated four issues for review which largely relate to jurisdiction of the 
Commission, exhaustion of remedies, and the finality of the Commission's orders. Those 
issues are as follows: 
1. Was the June 26, 1991 order of the AU a final order allowing Maverik to 
appeal to this Court without requesting review of the AU's order by the full commission 
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even though the issue of attorneys' fees has been reserved for further briefing and resolution 
by the AU? 
2. Assuming arguendo that this Court did not have jurisdiction and that the 
Commission retained jurisdiction, was the "filing" of a request for review complete upon 
mailing? 
3. Even assuming once again that the Commission had jurisdiction, and assuming 
that the mailing of the request was insufficient, but that the Commission abused its discretion 
in failing to grant an extension to Maverik to file its request for review, was the error 
harmless? 
4. Were the subsequent orders of the Commission final within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989)? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While Maverik contends that the Industrial Commission has made a convoluted mess 
of these proceedings, the facts of this case are relatively easy to understand. As outlined in 
the June 26th Order of the ALJ and supported by the facts, Maverik's Statement of Relevant 
Facts substantially followed the Order's facts; however, Maverik once again tries to 
improperly slant the facts in its favor. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, 
McCord concurs with the facts as laid out in the Industrial Commission of Utah's 
("Commission") brief and notes only a brief summary of the facts, in addition to those facts 
stated by Maverik that McCord finds incorrect. 
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The basic facts are that McCord was terminated within hours of her request to leave 
work to have her heart examined. Maverik's manager perceived McCord as having a serious 
heart condition and fired her on that basis. This action was clearly illegal discrimination by 
Maverik against a person perceived to have a serious handicap. 
In the "Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Agency Level" section in Maverik's 
Brief, pp. 2-5, McCord disputes the following assertions and implications: 
1. "1990-1991 - For some unexplained reason, the proceedings languish and are 
not actively prosecuted." McCord disagrees with this self-serving conclusion. 
2. "February 12, 1991 - 'No cause determination' is written on an official file 
document, after the Division loses contact with McCord for a considerable while." McCord 
denies any implication that there was ever a "no cause" finding. There is no evidence in the 
record that the handwritten words "no cause" came from the Commission or any evidence on 
when it was written on the document. There is evidence that the official determination that 
Maverik discriminated against McCord. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, Maverik does not marshal the evidence to challenge any factual errors it asserts 
nor does it cite to the record for many of its allegations and assertions as required by Rule 
24(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, these factually-based disputes 
and allegations should be dismissed. 
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Second, Maverik's initial Petition for Review from this Court (Docket No. 910413-
CA) did not transfer jurisdiction from the Commission to this Court because it requested 
review of an order that was not final and Maverik had not exhausted its administrative 
remedies. 
Third, Maverik did not timely file its requests for review of the ALJ's orders to the 
Commission, and even if those requests were found timely, the Commission addressed those 
review issues and thus any error was harmless. 
Fourth, the ALJ's orders were sufficiently clear as to set forth the relief and damages 
ordered. 
Fifdi, Maverik's due process rights were not violated and it is not entitled to a trial de 
novo. 
ARGUMENT 
While Maverik lays out four issues in the "Issues Presented for Review" section of its 
brief (Maverik's Brief, p. 1), in fact Maverik argues nine issues in the brief. McCord 
concurs with the arguments in the Commission's brief concerning the procedural arguments 
raised by Maverik and will not waste the Court's time by detailing those arguments. Instead, 
McCord will only make brief mention of some of those issues and concentrate on the 
substantive merits of Maverik's arguments and its dispute of factual allegations. McCord also 
notes that Maverik makes arguments of law and fact by referring to the initial Petition to this 
Court. While all these arguments can be confusing, McCord attempts to cut through this 
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confusion and demonstrates that this Petition, standing alone or with the other Petition, 
should be dismissed. 
I. MAVERIK FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE TO ADEQUATELY 
DISPUTE THE COMMISSION'S AND ALJ'S DETERMINATIONS. 
As noted above, this Court will not disturb the findings of the Commission unless 
Maverik can demonstrate that they are not supported by substantial evidence. Stewart v. 
Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Merriam v. Board of Review. 
812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Maverik's briefs in both petitions are woeftilly 
inadequate in challenging the findings of the Commission. Maverik confuses the issues when 
it protests the procedure of the Commission and asserts constitutional violations. Maverik 
obviously disagrees with the Commission's findings and conclusions, but fails to adequately 
challenge them. Maverik requests a trial de novo upon vague assertions of error in law and 
fact. 
Maverik alludes to evidence in the record upon which the ALJ relied in making her 
findings and thus acknowledges there is evidence to support of the findings it contests. 
However, Maverik's briefs do not marshal the evidence to display either any support for the 
findings or any flaw in the evidence upon which the ALT relied. In reality, all Maverik does 
is show there was a dispute in the evidence (as is almost always the case) or that Maverik had 
no contrary evidence and that the ALJ chose McCord's evidence upon which to rely. 
Maverik does not satisfy its burden. Accordingly, because of this failure to marshal the 
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evidence and demonstrate that the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, this Court 
should accept as conclusive the ALJ's findings. Stewart. 831 P.2d at 137-38; Merriam. 812 
P.2d at 450. 
In addition, Maverik has failed to reference this Court to documentary citations to 
support its allegations on pages 12 - 15 of its brief and thus fails to meet the requirements of 
Rule 24(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which requires "citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Maverik's bold assertions should be 
dismissed. 
II. JURISDICTION TO ACT BECAUSE MAVERIK'S INITIAL PETITION FOR 
REVIEW WAS INEFFECTIVE TO CONFER JURISDICTION TO THIS 
COURT. 
Maverik argues that merely because it filed an appeal, the Commission was without 
jurisdiction to continue to make determinations in this case. This argument ignores the fact 
that an appeal filed without regard to the finality of the order appealed from, exhaustion of 
administrative remedies and other review and appellate rules does not automatically confer 
jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals or strip the Commission of its jurisdiction. 
The AU's June 26, 1991 Order was not final within the requirements of UAPA, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (1989), nor had Maverik exhausted its administrative remedies in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1989). 
McCord concurs with the Commission's argument in Sections I and II of its brief, 
Commission Brief, pp. 28-35, that it was clear that the June 26, 1991 Order was not final 
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and that Maverik should be required to exhaust the administrative remedies before filing an 
appeal and that the Commission had the power to enter its orders and deny review. In the 
interest of judicial economy, McCord will not repeat those arguments here and refers the 
Court to the Commission's brief. 
III. MAVERIK DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE RULES IN FILING ITS 
REQUESTS FOR REVIEW AND EVEN THOUGH THE COMMISSION 
DENIED REVIEW, ITS ORDER INCLUDED A REVIEW OF THE 
DISPUTED ISSUES, THUS ANY ALLEGED ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Maverik argues that not only did the Commission rule against it, but that the 
Commission ignored its subsequent requests for review and it alleged bases for a good cause 
extension. This is simply not true. 
As noted in the Commission's Brief at pp. 37 - 42, Maverik did not timely file its 
request for review of the June 26, 1991 Order. Maverik first requested review of the June 
26, 1991 Order on October 11, 1991, well outside the 30-day requirement of Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12 (1989). Appendix A, Request for Review; R. 310-319. 
Further, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant an extension. 
Maverik failed to set out its argument regarding good cause for delay when it submitted 
either its request for review (Appendix A) or request for reconsideration (Appendix B) even 
though the Commission had informed Maverik in its February 28, 1992 Order Denying 
Review of requirement to show good cause for an untimely motion (Appendix C). Maverik 
waited until submitting its Limited Request for Reconsideration to make out grounds for good 
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cause (Appendix D). The Commission is correct in its determination that Maverik waived 
good cause grounds for its belated request. 
Although there was some question as to the finality of the June 26, 1991 order and the 
Commission determined initially that Maverik's filing was untimely, the Commission clearly 
considered and responded to all of Maverik's contentions in its orders denying review and 
reconsideration nonetheless. (Appendix C; Appendix E). Therefore, the alleged error was 
harmless. 
IV. THE ORDERS OF THE AU ARE FINAL AND MORE THAN 
ADEQUATELY SET FORTH THE RELIEF AND THE DAMAGES. 
The ALJ's Orders of June 26, 1991 regarding damages (Exhibit F) and the 
Supplemental Order of September 10, 1991 regarding attorneys' fees (Exhibit G) were clear 
and set forth an award of damages and attorneys' fees that can clearly be determined. 
Maverik argues that because the Order of June 26, 1991 does not set forth a specific number 
in terms of damages, that Order lacks specificity and the damages cannot be determined. 
This argument is patently false. 
The Order sets forth the following damages (in addition to injunctive relief not at issue 
here): 
1. Pay McCord back pay at a rate of $3.35 per four for 24 hours per week, or 
$80.40 per week from the date of termination through the date of the Order (June 26, 1991). 
Appendix F, pp. 8-9. Further, that McCord was to be credited with two subsequent 
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increases in the federal minimum wage, the first, effective April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour, 
and the second effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour. R. 138. 
2. McCord's back pay was to be reduced by all earnings from interim 
employment including her employment at Ashley Elementary School. R. 138. 
3. The ALJ awarded McCord attorneys' fees of $19,731.00 and costs of 
$1,536.26. Appendix G; R. 323. 
These Orders set forth a specific formula upon which to determine an award of 
damages, costs and attorneys' fees. That Maverik would assert that damages could not be 
determined because the ALJ did not add up those figures is meritless and harmless. 
The disingenuousness of Maverik's argument becomes apparent when it is noted that 
Maverik's dispute of McCord's attorneys' fees includes assertions regarding the computation 
of damages awarded to McCord. See Appendix E, p. 1; R. 254. 
For the foregoing reasons, Maverik's Petition for review of the Orders should be 
dismissed. 
V. MAVERIK IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TRIAL DE NOVO BECAUSE OF ITS 
VAGUE CONSTITUTIONALITY CLAIMS. 
As described above, the ALJ and the Commission has completely addressed Maverik's 
claims of error and has correctly applied the UAPA and other statutes in denying Maverik's 
subsequent requests for review. Even when denying review, the Commission has reviewed 
Maverik's contentions. Therefore, any error now claimed by Maverik is harmless. 
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In its final argument, Maverik makes a vague and unsubstantiated claim that it has 
been denied its due process rights and is entitled to a trial de novo. Clearly, this request 
implies that the factual findings made by the ALJ are in error because of a deficiency in the 
hearing. But Maverik does not state any particulars. Maverik notes that a trial de novo used 
to be the procedure and then appears to make the argument that because it is no longer the 
procedure, it is unconstitutional. It is unclear whether Maverik is arguing that the 
administrative procedure is unconstitutional on its face or whether the procedure as applied to 
Maverik has deprived it of its constitutional rights to access to the courts under the Utah 
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11. 
Maverik's vague arguments cannot support a claim as to the constitutionality of the 
Utah's administrative agency procedure. Utah courts have found in a workman's 
compensation setting that the delegation of power to the Industrial Commission does not 
violate the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. Industrial Comm'n v. Evans. 52 
Utah 394, 174 P. 825 (1918). More is needed to contest constitutionality. 
Neither can those claims support a deprivation of due process argument. Maverik 
does not give particulars as to how it was prejudiced by the hearing or the process or even 
how the procedure was unfair. When determining whether due process has been violated and 
a new trial is warranted, this Court has ruled that "due process demands a new trial when the 
appearance of unfairness is so plain that [the appellate court is] left with the abiding 
impression that a reasonable person would find the hearing unfair." Tolman v. Salt Lake 
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County Attorney. 828 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Bunnell v. Industrial 
Common. 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n.l (Utah 1987)). 
Clearly, the ALJ and the Commission did not engage in conduct so unfair that it 
would not meet the standard. Maverik did not comply with the procedural rules and cannot 
now claim that its constitutional rights have been violated. 
CONCLUSION 
Maverik's petition in this Petition, Docket No. 920296-CA, should be dismissed 
because it is meritless and because Maverik failed to marshal the evidence in support of its 
claims of error. Further, Maverik' petition for review in Docket No. 910413-CA should be 
dismissed due to lack of finality of the order from which it seeks review and Maverik's 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
DATED this MU] day of February, 1993. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
By ^*fiJXf%^<UL^ 
James W. Stewart 
Lisa A. Jones 
Attorneys for Complainant Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 7?^ day of February, 1993, I caused to be hand 
delivered and lodged a draft of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE McCORD with the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
M^^OS^T^^ 
I hereby certify that on the 7A&1 day of February, 1993, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, the required number of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE McCORD, to 
the following: 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
David C. Cundick 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Benjamin Sims 
Utah State Industrial Commission 
Anti-Discrimination Division 
100 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
r ^ y i ; CL Cj^AJ^tJ1 
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APPENDIX A 
October 11, 1991, Request for Review 
REQUEST FOR REVIEW 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
HEARING ROOM, 160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P. O. BOX 510910 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84151-0910 
UADD # 89-0031 
ooOoo 
VICKY ANN MCCORD 
Charging Party 
vs. 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE 
Respondent 
ooOoo 
Respondent Maverik Country Stores, Inc. hereby requests a 
review by the full Commission of the "SUPPLIMENTAL ORDER" and 
the earlier findings, conclusions and order, issued on September 
10f 1991 and June 26f 1991 respectively. 
The errors in the September 10, 1991 order include 
whether the amount of attorney fees awarded is erroneously high, 
and whether it should bear some relation to the damages sought. 
As to both orderf did the ALJ err in failing to determine 
the amount of damages? 
The errors in the June 26 Order, phrased as issues for 
review, are as follows: 
I. Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in awarding McCord lost 
wages for time periods after she acquired a better paying job, 
which she later quit? (Arbitrary and capricious or oppressive 
and unreasonable. Petty v. Utah State Bd. of Regentsy 595 P.2d 
481 (Utah 1979)}. 
II. Did the ALJ err in finding that Maverik treated McCord "as 
if" she were handicapped? (Substantial evidence test. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah App. 1989)}. Alternatively,* was that finding arbitrary 
and capricious? (Hurst v. Board of the Indust. Com., 723 P.2d 
416 (Utah 1986)}. 
III. Did the ALJ incorrectly find that any perceived abnormality 
constitutes a perceived "handicap". (Correction of error 
standard — review for correctness of statutory interpretation. 
Hurley v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 
1988)}. 
IV. Did the ALJ err in finding that clerking at a convenience 
store is a "major life activity" under the facts of the case? 
(Rational basis and reasonableness, applying law to facts, Dept. 
of Air Force v. Dept. of Emplmt. Sec, 786 P.2d 1361 (Utah App. 
1990)}. 
V. Was it error to find handicapped discrimination when no 
medical expert was called to testify? (Substantial evidence 
test. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)}. 
VI. Did the ALJ err in not ruling that McCord cannot prevail, 
since she has not produced substantial evidence that she was 
"otherwise qualified" to act in the job. (Substantial evidence 
test. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com., 
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)}. 
- 2 -
Authorities respecting issues on review. 
R486-1-3(F) (1),(3), (4) and (6), Dtah Admin. Code. 
§ 34-4-2(9), Utah Code 
§ 34-35-1, et seq.r Dtah Code. 
S 34-35-6(a)(i), Utah Code. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 637 (Utah 
1983). 
Maverik's Trial Brief is attached, and its arguments are 
all incorporated by reference.
 ; ^j 
Respectively Submitted this / day of October, 1991. 
P72X/1. 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
David C* Cundick 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to 
Benjamin Sims of the Commissionf and^ to James W. Stewartf 
counsel for claimant McCordf on the / 0 — day of Octoberf 1991, 
at 1500 First Interstate Plazaf 170 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101. 
ynM ^m. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX B 
March 19, 1992, Request for Reconsideration 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
DECEIVED 
WAR 1 r> 1??2 
NDUSTRIAL C O M M I S S I 
^DISCRIMINATION nivie^ 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE (sic), 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
UADD Case No. 89-0031 
TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH: 
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through 
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission 
reconsider its "Order Denying Review"
 f issued on February 28, 1992. 
This Request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code. 
The grounds for relief from the order are as follows: 
1. The Commission has erroneously interpreted section 63-46b-
1(9) to make the filing of Maverikfs Petition for Review untimely, 
and to avoid exercise of the Commission's discretion in extending 
any such deadline. The statute expressly applies only to time 
1 
periods "established for judicial review." It does not apply to 
agency review. 
2. To the extent necessary, Maverik hereby moves for a one 
day extension to petition for review by the Commission. 
3. The Commission has misperceived the law, in holding that 
the June 26, 1991 order of the ALJ was final. Issues were 
specifically and expressly reserved in that order (including 
attorney fees), and damages were not even calculated. The order 
was comparable to a partial summary judgment, which cannot be 
appealed to the next judicial level so long as issues remain 
undetermined. So long as the agency's order reserves anything to 
the agency for further decision, it is not a final order. Sloan v. 
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
4. Not being a final order, the petition for the Commission 
to review it could not have been tardy. 
5. While the commission acknowledges that the amount of 
recovery is a factor in determining attorney fee reasonableness, 
its Order Denying Review fails to expressly consider what effect 
the amount of recovery had in this case. See Order Denying Review, 
page seven. 
6. Attorney fees could not have been awarded and cannot be 
evaluated for reasonableness with the case in its current posture, 
since the amount of principal recovery has not been calculated, nor 
2 
can it be calculated based on the any order the Commission has 
entered to date. 
7. The Commission erred (Order Denying Review, page eight) in 
announcing how the damages could be calculated. It did so based on 
assumptions about voluntariness of McCord's losses, without basing 
the observation on any finding by the ALJ to that effect. Damages 
simply cannot be calculated without further hearing and 
supplemental findings. 
5. The Commission failed to consider the leading cases on the 
issues involved, particularly whether McCord can be said to have 
been treated "as if" she were "handicapped.11 See, e.g. Salt Lake 
City v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983); Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989) and Hurley v. Board 
of Review, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988). 
For all of the above reasons, Maverik requests that the 
Commission reconsider in full its Order Denying Review. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of March, 1992. 
R'on&ld C. Barker, Mitchell R. 
Barker and David C Cundick 
Attorneys for Defendant Maverik 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of March, 1992, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage 
prepaid to: 
James E. Stewart 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 44580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Benjamin A. Sims 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX C 
February 28, 1992, Order Denying Review 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UADD CASE NO. 89-0031 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE, 
Defendants. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for 
Review of the administrative law judged Order dated June 26, 1991 
which was submitted by respondents. The authority for. review is 
conferred by U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11), and Section 63-46b-12. 
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on 
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the 
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24, 
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed 
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24, 
1991. Respondent requested a formal hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a 
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10, 
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney 
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the 
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and 
September 10, 1991. 
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991 
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion 
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order, 
and could not therefore contest its provisions. 
The relevant facts are as follows. Ms. McCord was hired as a 
clerk by the Maverik Country Stores on September 30, 1988. She was 
interviewed and hired by Ms. Connie Jones, the store manager. Ms. 
McCord worked eight six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35 
per hour during her two weeks of part-time employment. (Exhibit A-
17) . She performed cashiering, bookkeeping, customer service, and 
stocking shelves. 
She had answered "no" to respondent's employment application 
question which asked her "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory 
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap 
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which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are 
applying?" However, Ms. McCord had been diagnosed with a heart 
condition called "mitral valve prolapse" while- living in California 
in January 1988 after she had tightness in her chest and a racing 
heartbeat. Ms. McCord related that her doctor had informed her 
that the condition required no changes in lifestyle or employment. 
She was prescribed a "beta blocker," and she had no further 
difficulties. 
Both parties stipulated that, among others, "mitral valve 
prolapse is a common and usually benign heart condition...." Dr. 
Ace Madsen examined Ms. McCord after her termination, and 
determined that she was "not at risk because of her heart problems 
in regard to her working at her job." Exhibits A-ll, A-7. 
While working on October 14, 1988, Ms. McCord experienced some 
tightness in her chest and grew increasingly uncomfortable. She 
asked her supervisor, Ms. Jones, if she could go to the hospital to 
get her heart checked. Ms. McCord disclosed her mitral valve 
prolapse condition to Ms. Jones in response to questions. 
While Ms. McCord was at the hospital, Ms. Jones checked Ms. 
McCord's application for employment. No heart condition had been 
noted by Ms. McCord. The doctor at the hospital indicated that Ms. 
McCord's heart was fine, but gave her a prescription for a change 
of beta blocker. Although Ms. McCord called about two hours later, 
and offered to complete the shift, Ms. McCord was told to stay home 
and rest. 
It is not clear where the termination of employment took 
place. There is some dispute about whether the termination took 
place over the telephone or at the store, but Ms. McCord was 
apparently called or summoned to the store by Ms. Jones on the same 
day as the hospital episode. During several of the discussions 
between Ms. Jones and Ms. McCord which took place on that day, Ms. 
Jones stated that her mother had died from heart problems, and her 
son had recently had open heart surgery. During the termination 
discussion, Ms. Jones expressed concern about the seriousness of 
Ms. McCord's heart problems. Ms. Jones then asked Ms. McCord why 
she did not disclose the heart condition on her application. Ms. 
McCord replied that she believed that it presented no restrictions 
on her, and that she did not consider it to be life threatening. 
Ms. Jones responded that she (Ms. Jones) would be afraid to leave 
Ms. McCord in the store alone. She then terminated Ms. McCord's 
employment. 
A Record of Employee Counseling form was completed by Ms. 
Jones which describes the circumstances of Ms. McCord's termination 
in a typewritten attachment. Exhibit A-4. This form and 




McCord's heart problem, and the potential that Ms. McCord would 
have another medical episode under the stress created if she 
continued employment at Maverik. Ms. Jones wrote that ,fI then told 
her it would be best if she looked for other less stressful 
employment.fl Id. 
Ms. Jones stated in response to an inquiry from the UADD 
during its investigation that "The day I terminated Vicki it was 
due to many things, all relating to her inability to handle stress 
on the job and do her job accurately...." Exhibit A-5. Again, it 
appears that Ms. Jones was focusing in on the stress factor. 
At the hearing, some additional factors for termination were 
discussed: 1) Ms. McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump 
meters; and, 2) allegations that customers and employees had 
complained about smelling alcohol on Ms. McCord's breath during 
work. Ms. McCord denied using alcohol before working, and Ms. 
Jones and another employee testified that Ms. McCord/s cash 
register till was accurate. Significantly, none of these 
allegations were discussed during the termination interview, or 
were written on the termination form or attachment. 
There is no question that Ms. Jones had the authority from 
Maverik to hire and fire Ms. McCord. 
Ms. McCord testified and introduced evidence that after her 
termination she attempted to find employment at 26 employment 
locations during 1989-1991. Exhibit A-8. She worked for a short 
time as a janitor at an elementary school from November 1988 
through January 1989. Although there was some testimony that 
Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements about Ms. McCord 
to other persons in the Vernal area, the ALJ found no direct 
evidence that Maverik or its employees had ever interfered with Ms. 
McCord/s ability to seek other employment. 
The ALJ then concluded as a matter of law that "Maverik 
Country Stores engaged in a prohibited employment practice under 
Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord." The ALJ based this 
conclusion on Maverik's perception of Ms. McCord as handicapped. 
There was no evidence that McCord's actual physical 
condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a phy-
sical or mental impairment, but it was 'treated as 
constituting such a limitation,' ... and further, did 
'substantially limit major life activities only as a 
result of the attitudes of others toward such an im-
pairment. . . .' 




The ALJ further stated in her application of facts to her 
conclusions of law that Ms. McCord was otherwise qualified to 
perform the work. 
The ALJ then ordered the following in favor of Vicky Ann 
McCord and against Maverik Country Stores: 
1. Liability for a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice in the nature of handicap discrimination. 
2. An order to Maverik to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practices. 
3. Full relief to Ms. McCord including reinstatement to 
employment in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with 
full rights, privileges and protections of employment. 
4. Payment of back pay calculated at $80.40 per week for 
24 hours per week with the period of back pay running from the date 
of termination through June 26, 1991 with increases in pay 
commensurate with increases in the federal minimum wage effective 
April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to 
$4.25 per hour, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim 
employment. 
5. An order to Maverik to take such affirmative action 
as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from its environment any 
employment discrimination prohibited by law. 
6. No retaliation by Maverik against Ms. McCord for 
having exercised her right to file this action. 
7. Payment of a reasonable attorney's fee by Maverik to 
counsel for Ms. McCord. 
8. Maverik was to take any other applicable and 
reasonable relief as may be necessary to restore Ms. McCord to her 
rightful position. 
9. And, finally, a notice that any Motion for Review of 
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within 30 days of June 26, 
1991, specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, 
and that the order would be final and not subject to review or 





WHETHER MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES 
TIMELY FILED ITS MOTIONS FOR REVIEW? 
The ALJ issued her initial Order on June 26, 1991. She then 
issued a supplemental order dealing only with attorney's fees on 
September 10, 1991. The Request for Review by Maverik was received 
by the IC on October 11, 1991. This request was not received 
within the 30 days after issuance of the initial order on June 26, 
1991, as required by U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(l)(a), and good cause 
for the delay has not been shown by Maverik under U.C.A. Section 
63-46b-l(9). The latter statute states: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause 
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time 
period prescribed in this chapter, except those 
time periods established for judicial review. 
Thus, the order of June 26, 1991 cannot be reviewed by the IC, and 
therefore becomes the final order of the IC with regard to the 
issues addressed within it. U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11)(b). 
With regard to the order of September 10, 1991 which related 
to attorney's fees, the filing by Maverik of its Request for Review 
was mailed by it on October 10, 1991, and was received by the IC on 
October 11, 1991. R486-1-4-5 (Utah Admin. Code) requires that a 
request for review be submitted in accordance with U.C.A. Section 
63-46b-12. 
Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) requires an aggrieved party to: 
File a written request for review within 30 days 
after the issuance of the order with the person 
or entity designated for that purpose by the sta-
tute or rule. 
The operative portions of the statute above are "file a 
written request for review within 30 days...with the person..." and 
"after issuance of the order...." Since issuance of the order is 
the first in the sequence of events which triggers the 30 day 
period, the nature of issuance must be determined. 
There is little case law construing the meaning of issuance, 




synonymous with delivery or mailing. Sunnvside Nurseries, Inc. v. 
Agri. Labor Relations Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155, 93 CA.3d 922. 
The Order of the ALJ shows that it was mailed on September 10, 
1991. Therefore, the issuance took place on that date. 
It has been suggested that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(URCP), Rule 6(e) gives the aggrieved party an extra three days to 
file. This reliance is misplaced since Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) 
clearly establishes the timing standard for this administrative 
process. 
Since Maverik's Request for Review was received on October 11, 
1991, that is the date of filing. That date was on the 31st day 
after issuance, and was not timely. However, the IC will discuss 
the remaining issues as raised by Maverik for the benefit of the 
parties. 
ISSUE TWO 
WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS "ERRONEOUSLY 
HIGH, AND SHOULD BEAR SOME RELATION 
TO THE DAMAGES SOUGHT?" 
U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) allows the ALJ to, among other 
actions, award attorneys7 fees and costs. The ALJ awarded Ms. 
McCord's counsel legal fees of $19,731, and awarded Ms. McCord 
$1,536.26 for costs in connection with her claim before the IC. 
Maverik asserted the issue of whether the fees were 
"erroneously high, and should bear some relation to the damages 
sought" in its Revised Memorandum Opposing Attorney Fee Award which 
was received by the ALJ on August 13, 1991. Ms. McCord's legal 
counsel had sought $25,400.50 which was claimed to represent the 
work of three attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec, and Diane 
Abbeglen, at the hourly rates of $125, $80, and $80, respectively. 
The ALJ reduced the fees to the amount noted in the immediately 
preceding paragraph. 
The ALJ correctly used the factors to both award and to reduce 
the award based on case law which identified the following key 
factors to consider in awarding attorney's fees: relationship of 
the fee to the amount recovered, novelty and difficulty of the 
issues, overall result achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit 
to vindicate rights, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, 




the attorneys involved. Supplemental Order of the ALJ, at 2 (Sep. 
10, 1991). 
Maverik asserts that Ms. McCord will recover approximately 
$8,000, and that the attorneys fees are excessive when that 
recovery is considered. The amount in controversy is a factor 
only, and it generally takes as much time to try a discrimination 
case for an employee making a minimum wage as it does to try one 
for a supervisor receiving much more compensation. Cf. Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); Cabrera v. 
Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985). 
Considering all relevant factors, we cannot say that the 
amount awarded was excessive based on the ALJ's reasoning to the 
effect that this hearing required one full day; that the attorneys 
for Ms. McCord carefully documented their hourly charges; that Ms. 
McCord had to initiate the hearing to vindicate her rights since 
Maverik did not acknowledge its liability notwithstanding the cause 
finding issued by the UADD; that the result obtained by Ms. 
McCord's counsel who were knowledgeable and competent in employment 
discrimination law was successful, and that the fees charged were 
within the customary range for the Salt Lake City legal community. 
Since Ms. McCord's counsel have not challenged the reduction 
of their fees, we will not discuss the reduction except to note 
that we find the reduction to be reasonable and appropriate. 
For the above reasons, we find the attorney/s fees awarded to 
Ms. McCord7s attorneys to be appropriate in light of the 
documentation, expertise and work required in her case. 
ISSUE THREE 
WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN 
FAILING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT 
OF DAMAGES? 
Maverik styled its issue as stated in the heading above, but 
more specifically at page 2 of its request asked whether the ALJ 
abused her discretion in awarding Ms. McCord lost wages for time 
periods "after she acquired a better paying job, which she later 
quit?" 
It is appropriate to award back pay from the date of the 
discrimination until the date of judgement or the date of trial. 
Gathercole v. Global Associates, 560 F.Supp. 642, 647 (1983), rev'd 




Carolina Bd of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983) 
cert, den. 464 U.S. 1044, 79 L.ed 2d 176, 14 S.Ct. 712. The ALJ 
awarded back pay in this instance from the date of termination 
until the date of her order. 
Federal law governs the award of back pay in other types of 
discrimination cases, but is instructive in this case. 42 U.S.C. 
Section 2000e-5. The purpose of an award of back pay is to make 
the party whole for injuries suffered through discrimination. The 
employer is not responsible for losses willingly incurred by Ms. 
McCord. Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1278 
(4th Cir. 1985) . We can find nothing in the file which shows that 
Ms. McCord willingly incurred any loss. When she left her 
employment at the elementary school, she did so due to illness 
beyond her control. The ALJ correctly required only an offset by 
reducing Ms. McCord's award by all earnings from interim 
employment, including her elementary school job. 
We therefore find that the ALJ was correct in law and fact in 
light of the entire record. 
ISSUE FOUR 
DID THE ALJ ERR WHEN SHE 
FOUND THAT MAVERIK HAD TREATED 
MS. MCCORD AS IF SHE WERE HANDICAPPED? 
Maverik asserts that the ALJ erred when she found that Maverik 
had treated Ms. McCord as if she were handicapped. The ALJ found 
that "Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of 
McCord as handicapped." Order of the ALJ, at 6 (June 26, 1991). 
Maverik now claims that Ms. McCord is not handicapped since mitral 
valve prolapse is a common condition usually accompanied by no 
symptoms at all. Trial Brief as incorporated into the Request for 
Review, Maverik Country Stores, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1991). 
This issue is relevant as it relates to U.C.A. Section 34-35-
6(1)(a)(i) which states in pertinent part: 
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or 
to discharge, demote, terminate any person, . . . 
because of ... handicap .... 
The Utah statutes do not discuss the concept of perceived 
handicap. However, R486-1-2 (Utah Admin. Code) was promulgated by 




that the subject individual will be treated as if he or she has a 
handicap where the individual: 
Has a record of such an impairment •.. or has 
been regarded as having, a mental or physical 
impairment 
R486-1-2F5 (Utah Admin. Code). 
The Utah Administrative Code further provides that the 
individual may be regarded as having a handicap if others think 
that he or she has such a disability, or is considered by others to 
have a limitation on a major life activity. R486-l-2F6a,b,c (Utah 
Admin. Code). A person who has no disability or handicap, but who 
is treated by others as if he or she is impaired (perception of 
impairment) , may be just as impaired by virture of treatment by 
others as one who is actually impaired. 
The ALJ correctly found that the termination was due to Ms. 
McCord's employer7s perception of her as handicapped, and that she 
was otherwise qualified to perform the work. Finally, her employer 
made no attempt to obtain medical advice as to the perceived 
handicap, or whether she could reasonably accommodate Ms. McCord's 
perceived medical condition. 
We therefore conclude that this asserted issue by Maverik is 
without merit, and that the ALJ was correct. 
ISSUE FIVE 
WHETHER THE ALJ INCORRECTLY 
FOUND THAT ANY PERCEIVED 
ABNORMALITY CONSTITUTES 
A PERCEIVED HANDICAP? 
It is clear to us that the ALJ did not find that any perceived 
abnormality constitutes a perceived handicap. Maverik misstates 
the findings of the ALJ. A finding of abnormality is not required. 
Whatever impairment exists must be either a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more of a persons 
major life activities, U.C.A. Section 34-35-3(9), and where the 
impairment does not actually exist either in part or in whole, the 
perception must also rise to the level of substantially limiting 
one or more of a person's major life activities. 
Major life activity is defined as including experiencing 
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment 




A person is regarded as having an impairment when he or she 
(a) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities, but is treated as constituting such a 
limitation; (b) has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the 
attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or (c) has none of 
the impairments listed in the definition of physical or mental 
impairment above, but is treated as having such an impairment. 
R486-1-2F6 (Utah Admin. Code). 
Here, Maverik terminated Ms. McCord based on its perception of 
the severity of Ms. McCord's medical condition. Ms. McCord's 
condition was probably not an impairment, but her condition was 
treated as a serious one by Maverik. A job is a major life 
activity, including clerking at a convenience store, and there is 
a legal requirement to reasonably accommodate such employees unless 
undue hardship can be shown. 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the ALJ met the 
requirements of law in light of the whole record. 
ISSUE SIX 
WHETHER A MEDICAL EXPERT IS 
REQUIRED TO TESTIFY BEFORE 
A FINDING OF HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION 
CAN BE MADE? 
Both parties stipulated before the hearing that mitral valve 
prolapse is usually a benign condition, and that Exhibit A-11 would 
be "authoritative on the condition of Mitral Valve Prolapse. ...,f 
Exhibit A-11. Having stipulated that this exhibit would be 
authoritative as to Ms. McCord's condition, there appears to be no 
good reason why a medical expert is required. The question before 
the ALJ was not whether Ms. McCord was actually handicapped, but 
whether Maverik treated her as if she was disabled. The evidence 
is clear that even though Ms. McCord was capable of performing her 
job, Maverik's manager perceived her to have a serious heart 
problem, and as a result fired her. 





WHETHER MS. MCCORD SHOWED THAT 
SHE WAS QUALIFIED TO ACT IN THE 
JOB? 
Maverik contends that Ms. McCord never showed that she was 
qualified for the job from which she was terminated. At the time 
of Ms. McCord's termination she was told that she was terminated 
because of her heart condition. It was only after the termination, 
and after an investigation was requested by the UADD, that Maverik 
gave any other reasons for Ms. McCord's termination. 
While working at Maverik, Ms. McCord's supervisor was 
confident enough in her abilities to leave her alone to perform her 
duties in the store after only three days of training. Ms. Jones, 
her supervisor, had never confronted Ms. McCord with any of the 
allegations which were subsequently lodged against her after the 
termination. In fact, Ms. McCord was scheduled to work on the day 
of her termination alone for most of her shift. 
At the hearing, Maverik alleged that Ms. McCord was not 
otherwise qualified because of problems she had reading the gas 
pumps. However, a witness who worked for Maverik testified that 
everyone had problems reading the pump meters. Ms. McCord 
testified that prior to her termination she had learned to read the 
meters, and that she had been complimented on her accuracy on the 
till. 
It is significant that Ms. McCord was apparently performing 
her job duties properly until the time that she asked to go to the 
hospital, and that her qualifications had not been questioned up to 
that point. 
This alleged error is therefore without merit, and we find 
that the ALJ determinations and conclusions were correct. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the previous reasons, we find that the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Administrative Law Judge 
were correct in law and fact in view of substantial evidence in the 
whole record. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the orders of the administrative law judge 




IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall 
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. 
;ephen M. Hadle 
Chairman 
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Certified this ^£>T7^ day 
of jtfrJLuM
 <r , 1992 . ^ 
P a t r i c i a O. Ashb^ J" fi 
i Commission Secretary' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on February^' C '-1, 1992, a copy of the 
attached ORDER DENYING REVIEW in the case of VICKY MCCORD was 
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage 
paid: 
Vicky McCord 
c/o Attorney James E. Stewart 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
James E. Stewart 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney at Law 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law Judge, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
APPENDIX D 
April 3, 1992, Limited Request for Reconsideration 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600 





, Case Number: UADD 89-0031 




Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through 
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission 
reconsider its denial of Maverikfs request that the Commission 
lengthen its time within which to file any motion for review by the 
Commission of the Supplemental Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge, which was issued on or about September 10, 1991. This 
request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code, and is 







The grounds for relief from the Order are: 
1. The procedural events in this matter to date are as 
follows: 
a. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was issued, 
reserving attorney fee issue for later determination, June 26, 
1991. 
b. Supplemental Order awarding approximately $20,000 in 
attorney fees and costs issued by the Administrative Law Judge, 
September 10, 1991. 
c. Request for Review prepared and mailed October 10, 1991 
but not received by the Commission until October 15, 1991 (the day 
after Columbus Day). 
d. Industrial Commission issues Order Denying Review, finding 
in part that Maverik's Motion for Review was untimely, February 28, 
1992. 
e. Maverik files Request for Reconsideration, March 19, 1992, 
including therein a Motion for an Extension of Time through August 
15, 1992 for filing a Petition for Review. 
f. Commission issues Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration, including denial of Maverik's request that the 
time period with in which to Request Review be extended, March 30, 
1992. 
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2. Good cause has been shown and is further shown herein (see 
below) . The good cause previously shown was the fact that the 
document was prepared, executed and mailed on October 10, 1991, 
which is the due date by statute. 
3. Section 63-46b-l(9), Utah Code, permits lengthening of any 
time period for action by the Commission "for good cause shown". 
4. The Commission has, for the first time in its Order 
Denying Reconsideration, properly found that the original Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge Church was not a final order. See, 
Order Denying Reconsideration, March 30, 1992, page 2. This 
changes the entire face of this case and justifies appropriate 
review of all the matters at issue. The Commission having 
determined the initial order to be non-final, procedural matters 
should be set aside for an initial determination on the merits of 
the ALJ's original order. 
5. Further good cause for the extremely short extension 
request that is shown as follows: 
a. Most of the "tardy" days are not chargeable to Maverik 
under law. They include October 12 and 13, weekends, as well as 
October 14, Columbus Day. 
b. As pointed out in the Commission's Order Denying Review, 
page 5 and 6, there is little case authority construing what 
constitutes "issuance" by the Commission. It is also far from 
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clear what constitutes "filing" with the Commission- Because of 
these ambiguities and because of the policy of the Commission of 
avoiding hyper-formality, extensions should be freely granted when 
requested in good faith. 
c. The Supplemental Order for which review was sought by 
Maverik was received by "counsel for Maverik on September 11 or 12, 
1991, 28 or 29 days prior to the preparation and mailing of the 
Petition for Review. 
d. At about the time the ALJ issued her Supplemental Order, 
and just prior to Maverik1s counsel receiving the same, the 
undersigned, Mitchell R. Barker, was employed on an emergency basis 
to defend a criminal defendant in a jury trial set to start (and 
which did start) on September 16, 1991. The case was State of Utah 
vs. Stephen Cartisano and Challenger Foundation II, 90-CR-47, Sixth 
Circuit Court, Kane County. 
e. From prior to receipt of the Supplemental Order until 
September 17, 1991, Mitchell R. Barker and David C. Cundick, who is 
the other attorney who is handling this case and who appeared at 
the formal hearing in this matter with Mr. Barker, were both 
involved day and night in defense of Stephen Cartisano in that well 
publicized trial which was held in Kanab, Utah. Little time was 
taken to eat or sleep, and there was no time to consider items 
received in the mail. 
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f. September 18, 1991, was the first day that Maverik's 
counsel were back in the office, after the Cartisano trial ended in 
a mistrial. The Cartisano matter is scheduled to be heard again in 
May 1992 after a change of venue to West Valley City. 
g. The undersigned had another trial on October 3, 1991 
before Judge Daniels in Third District Court, along with several 
other in Court and out of Court matters during the period from 
September 17, 1991 through October 10, 1991, the date Maverik's 
Petition was due and the date it was prepared and mailed. Those 
included several days trying to catch up on office work after the 
Cartisano. 
h. On the due date for the Petition, it was not ready and 
hand delivered to the Industrial Commission before 5:00 because 
virtually the entire day was spent researching and arguing before 
Judge Mower of the Sixth Circuit Court in Kane County, on the issue 
of Cartisanofs successful Motion to Change Venue from Kane County 
to Salt Lake County. 
6. Under Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code, it appears that on the 
due date for intra-agency review a request may be mailed rather 
than hand filed. That section states that the request shall "state 
the date upon which it was mailed" and "be sent by mail to the 
presiding officer and to each party". See also Section 63-46b-
1(9), Utah Code. 
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7. This is not a repeat of the prior motion to reconsider, or 
a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to reconsider. An 
enlargement of time was first requested on March 19 of this year, 
and was denied for the only time on March 30, 1992. 
Wherefore, good cause has previously been shown and is here 
further shown for the very short extension sought be Maverik to 
make its Petition for Review of the 'Supplemental Order timely, 
despite the fact that it was mailed on the due date and received 
shortly thereafter by the Commission. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 1992. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Ronald C Barker 
David C. Cundick 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of April, 1992, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage 
prepaid to: 
James W. Stewart 
Kay C. Krivanec 
JONES, WALDO, KOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Benjamin Sims 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
% ^ •#. i 
Mitchell R. Barker 
6 
APPENDIX E 
March 30, 1992, Order Denying Request for Reconsideration 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6600 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, * 
* 
Applicant, * ORDER DENYING 
vs. * REQUEST FOR RE-
* CONSIDERATION 
* 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES, * 
* UADD No. 89-0031 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The request for reconsideration by the respondent in the 
above entitled matter to review its Order Denying Review, issued on 
February 28, 1992, having been duly considered under the authority 
of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-13 (1953 as amended), the request for 
reconsideration is denied for the following reasons: 
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on 
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the 
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24, 
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed 
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24, 
1991. Respondent requested a formal hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a 
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10, 
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney 
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the 
Industrial Commission of the ALJ/s orders of June 26, 1991, and 
September 10, 1991. 
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991 
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion 
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order, 
and could not therefore contest its provisions. 
Maverik Country Stores first contends that the Commission has 
erroneously interpreted section 63-46b-l(9) to make the filing of 
Maverik/s Petition for Review untimely, and to avoid exercise of 
the Commissions discretion in extending any such deadline. This 
section states: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause 
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shown, from lengthening or shortening any time 
period prescribed in this chapter, except those 
time periods established for judicial review. 
(Emphasis added). 
This statute allows a presiding officer to lengthen or shorten 
a time period based upon good cause shown. Maverik did not ask the 
Commission to lengthen its time period based on good cause shown, 
nor did it show any good cause for doing so. As can be seen by its 
clear strictures, it applies only to agency review, and not to 
judicial review as asserted by Maverik. We therefore reject 
Maverik's first issue. 
Next, Maverik asks for a one day extension to petition for 
review by the Commission. Again, this request must be rejected 
based on failure of Maverik to show good cause. 
Third, Maverik states that the ALJ order of June 26, 1991 was 
not final since issues were specifically reserved in the order and 
damages were not calculated. Upon further review, we agree that 
the June 26, 1991 order was not final because the issue of attor-
ney fees was reserved by the following language: 
The parties reserved the question of an ap-
propriate attorney1s fees award, pending 
this Order, and shall address that in sup-
plemental briefs to the Commission. 
Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991). 
Notwithstanding this concession, Maverik did not meet the 
statutory deadline for filing a request for review of the final 
order which addressed attorney fees issued on September 10, 1991 by 
the ALJ. Again, Maverik has shown no good cause as to why the 
Commission should extend the filing time. 
Maverik also contends that the order could not have been final 
because damages were not calculated. It cites Sloan v. Board of 
Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989) for this proposition. We find 
that the order of the ALJ was explicit enough to calculate damages 
since Ms. McCord was awarded, among other provisions, reinstatement 
to employment, and back pay, at the rates specified on page eight 
of the ALJ order, from the date of unlawful termination until the 
date of the ALJ order, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim 
employment. Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991). The offsets are 
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listed on page eight of the order, and the date of termination, 
among other findings of fact, are shown on pages two through five. 
The monetary damages can thus be reasonably calculated. 
The remaining allegations of error were addressed in the 
Motion of Review of defendant dated October 15, 1991, and the 
Commission again finds them nonmeritorius. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Request for Reconsideration of 
defendant is dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-4 6b-16. The requesting party shall 
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Certified this o ^ ^ d a y of 
^ZhMi^l^ 1992 
Patricia O. Ashbyf 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I did mail by prepaid first class postage the 
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on Vicky Ann McCord, Case 
No. 89-0031 on 30 March 1992 to the following: 
Mitchell R. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
James E. Stewart 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 910413-CA 
X S 0^__^ \^ x*vl_ 
BENJAMIN A- SIMS 
APPENDIX F 
June 26, 1991, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UADD Case No, 89-0031 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
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Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City/ Utah on May 15, 
1991, at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
The Charging Party was present and represented by 
James W. Stewart, Attorney at Law. 
The Respondent was present and represented by 
Mitchell Barker, Attorney at Law. 
This is a claim of discrimination based on handicapped status 
brought by Vicky McCord against Maverik Country Stores in 
connection with her termination of employment. The Charge was 
filed with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division on October 24, 
1988. The Division issued its Determination on January 24, 1991 
finding that Respondent had violated the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act of 1965, as amended, and issued an Order on the same date 
requiring Respondent to conciliate the issue. On February 15, 
1991, Respondent requested a formal hearing before the Commission 
on the Charge, and the request was granted. 
A de novo evidentiary hearing was held, during which sworn 
testimony and exhibits were presented. During the hearing, 
several rulings were made from the bench, including a denial of 
Respondent's oral Motion for Summary Judgment at the close of 
Charging Party's case. The Administrative Law Judge also found 
that Respondent's corporate officials received adequate notice of 
the Charge and subsequent investigation through copies to the 
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corporate office. Respondent argued that a handwritten notation by 
an unidentified person of "no cause determination" on a letter 
dated February 6, 1991 constituted a finding of no cause by UADD 
(Exhibit A-16), but the Administrative Law Judge ruled that the 
UADD's actual Determination, dated January 24, 1991, was the only 
binding agency action on the merits. The parties expressly 
reserved the right to brief the question of attorney's fees 
following the issuance of an Order on the merits. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge and the 
parties were given time to submit simultaneous closing briefs. 
Having received said briefs, and having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Vicky Ann McCord (McCord) was hired as a clerk by Maverik 
Country Store on September 30, 1988. She was interviewed and hired 
by Maverik's Store Manager, Connie Jones (Jones.) Jones had the 
authority to hire and fire employees on behalf of Maverik, based on 
her testimony and that of her supervisors. McCord/s position was 
part-time, working six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35 per 
hour. She worked eight shifts during her two weeks of employment, 
Exhibit A-17. She was trained by Jones and another employee, Suzie 
Jenkins (Jenkins.) Her duties including cashiering, stocking 
shelves, some bookkeeping and customer service. 
At the time of hiring, McCord filled out an employment 
application (Exhibit A-l), which included a question concerning 
physical abilities: "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory 
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap 
which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are 
applying?" McCord checked the box marked "no." 
The evidence demonstrates that McCord had been diagnosed with 
a heart condition known as "mitral valve prolapse" during January, 
1988, while living in California. This diagnosis followed an 
episode of tightness in her chest and a racing heartbeat. She 
consulted a Dr. Watkins, whose opinion is not contained in the 
evidence. McCord's recollection of that consultation was that the 
condition did not present any restrictions on her lifestyle or 
employment. She was given a "beta blocker" medication and 
experienced no further problems. 
The Administrative Law Judge takes judicial notice of the 
generic information on mitral valve prolapse which was placed into 
the record by stipulation of the parties as Exhibit A-ll. Said 
information states, in part, that "mitral valve prolapse is a 
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common and usually benign heart condition... An estimated 4 percent 
to 7 percent of the population has M V P — Because MVP is so common, 
some authorities believe that the condition is simply a normal 
variant in heart structure, rather than a disease as such." 
Evidence was also submitted from Dr. Ace Madsen, who examined 
McCord after her termination, stating that McCord "is not at risk 
because of her heart problems in regard to her working at her job." 
(Exhibit A-7) Dr. Madsen further stated that the mitral valve 
prolapse problem, "should not interfere with any athletic or work 
related endeavors." 
On October 14, 1988, McCord reported for her shift at noon. 
Jones was working in the store office. McCord began working but 
felt some tightness in her chest and grew increasingly 
uncomfortable. She asked Jones if she could leave the store and go 
to the hospital to get her heart checked. In response to Jones' 
questions, she disclosed the mitral valve prolapse condition. 
Jones agreed to allow her time off to seek medical attention. 
At the hospital, McCord was examined and her heart was 
monitored (Exhibit A-18.) McCord testified that the emergency room 
doctor indicated her heart was fine, and suggested a change of her 
"beta blocker" medication. After giving her a new prescription, he 
released her to return to work. 
While McCord was at the hospital, Jones referred to McCord's 
application and noted that no heart condition had been disclosed. 
Jones later called the hospital to check on McCord, and could not 
obtain any information. McCord called Jones approximately two 
hours later and offered to resume her shift. Jones told her to 
stay home and rest. Jones then called McCord back and told her she 
needed to come in to the store and discuss the situation with 
Jones. McCord grew apprehensive and asked why. Jones stated that 
she would prefer not to discuss the matter on the telephone, but 
she went on to say that Jones' mother had died from heart problems, 
and her son had recently had heart surgery. Jones commented that 
she was concerned about the seriousness of McCord's heart problem. 
The parties dispute whether or not McCord then came into the 
store for a subsequent discussion with Jones, or whether the 
termination of employment took place by telephone. In either 
event, a discussion was had between Jones and McCord later that day 
concerning McCord's heart condition. Jones asked McCord why she 
did not disclose the heart condition on her application. McCord 
responded that she did not believe it presented any restrictions on 
her performance of the job, and she did not consider it life-
threatening. Jones then reiterated her statements about Jones' 
mother and son having heart problems, and stated she would be 
afraid to leave McCord in the store alone. McCord stated that she 
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did not perceive her condition to be as serious as that of Jones' 
mother or son. Jones then terminated McCord/s employment with 
Maverik, stating that she would "do better somewhere else.11 
On the same day, Jones prepared a Record of Employee 
Counseling form as required by Maverik policy (Exhibit A-4) which 
states that McCord was terminated, and described the circumstances 
in an attached handwritten letter. That letter states in part: 
I told her I would worry about her being on the job 
alone. She said it would not happen again and I then 
told her how could she make that guarantee when she had 
to leaver earlier and said she would not remain on the 
job. 
I also told her my sympathies were with her as my son had 
had open heart surgury (sic) July 1st and my mom had died 
of heart problems and complications following surgery. 
At this time I told her she had not mentioned this at the 
interview when asked if she had medical problems that 
would interfere with her doing her job. 
I then told her it would be best if she looked for other 
less stressful employment. 
Jones testified in the hearing that the reasons she stated in 
Exhibits A-4 and A-5 were the actual reasons she made the decision 
to terminate McCord. Exhibit A-5 is Jones' response to the Anti-
Discrimination Division investigation. It states in pertinent 
part: 
The day I terminated Vicki it was due to many things, all 
relating to her inability to handle stress on the job and 
do her job accurately... 
According to Vicki she told me in the office that her 
heart problem was sometimes brought on by stress. A 
convenience store clerk is under nothing but stress. Not 
only is the pace fast, but you are responsible for 
stocking, cleaning during your shift, dealing with 
customers and running the cash register... 
My opinion at the time I terminated Vicki was that both 
physically and mentally she would be more comfortable in 
a job that had a slower pace. 
There was some testimony at the hearing concerning McCord's 
job performance. Both Jones and Jenkins testified that McCord had 
difficulty reading the gasoline pump meters correctly. McCord 
admitted this problem but added that Jones and Jenkins reassured 
her that other employees had the same problem during the first few 
weeks. Jenkins and Jones testified that each had customers 
complain about the smell of liquor on McCord's breath during work, 
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and they smelled it also. Jones stated that she asked McCord on 
one occasion if she had been drinking and she denied it* McCord 
denied under oath the use of alcohol before working. Jones and 
Jenkins testified that McCord was accurate in her cash register 
till, and McCord recalled having been complimented on her accuracy. 
Despite the above comments, Jones did not mention any claimed 
job performance problems with McCord during the termination 
discussion. That discussion centered around Jones' perception of 
a heart problem. The Record of Employee Counseling which 
documented the termination did not state any other reason for 
counseling, although it contained blanks for such reasons as 
"intoxication," "personal conduct," "unsatisfactory work 
performance," and "violation of company rules." (Exhibit A-4) It 
also contains a statement that McCord/s performance was "average." 
There is no documentation that Jones ever counseled or disciplined 
McCord concerning the performance issues described above. 
Substantial testimony was taken on such issues as the other 
handicapped employees working for Maverik, and the employment 
history of McCord prior to this job, but such matters are deemed 
not relevant to the claim of handicapped discrimination. 
Respondent's witnesses Robert Child and Dana Dean, both senior 
Maverik employees to Jones, testified that Jones did have authority 
to hire and fire employees, and that she acted within the scope of 
her authority with regard to McCord. 
After being terminated by Maverik, McCord pursued other 
employment. She testified and introduced evidence showing that she 
made application at twenty-six places of employment during 1989-
1991 (Exhibit A-8) . She did briefly work at Ashley Elementary 
School as a janitor from November, 1988 through January, 1989. She 
anticipates working for the Forest Service this year. There was 
also some attenuated testimony at the hearing concerning the 
allegation that Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements 
of a personal nature about McCord to third persons in the Vernal, 
Utah area. There is, however, no direct evidence that Maverik or 
its employees ever interfered in McCord's ability to seek other 
employment. 
Based on the testimony of Jones, it is apparent that Jones 
retains some hostile feelings toward McCord. She testified to 
making a derogatory personal comment about McCord while waiting to 
testify in the hearing. She also admitted during testimony that 
she did not consider McCord to be honest nor "a good person." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Utah law provides that it is a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice for an employer to terminate any person, 
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otherwise qualified/ because of handicap, U.C.A. 34-35-6. 
"Handicap" is defined in the rules promulgated thereunder as "a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one of 
more of an individual's major life activities. Being regarded as 
having a handicap is equivalent to being handicapped or having a 
handicap," R486-1-2(F)(1). 
"Major life activity" is defined to include experiencing 
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment 
because of a handicap," R486-1-2(F) (3) . If,ls regarded as having an 
impairment means (a) has a physical or mental impairment that does 
not substantially limit major life activities but is treated as 
constituting such a limitation; (b) has a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as 
a result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or 
(c) has none of the impairments listed in the definition of 
physical or mental impairment above but is treated as having such 
an impairment," R486-1-2(F)(6). 
The statute and regulations further provide that "An employer 
shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or 
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program," 
R486-1-2(J)(1). 
Applying the above law to the facts, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that Maverik Country Stores engaged in a prohibited 
employment practice under Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord. 
Maverik/s termination of McCord rested on its perception of McCord 
as handicapped. There was no evidence that McCord's actual 
physical condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical 
or mental impairment, but it was "treated as constituting such a 
limitation," R486-1-2(F)(6)fa) and further, did "substantia1lv 
limit major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of 
others toward such an impairment," R486-1-2 (F) (6Wc) . 
Specifically, Jones' attitude toward persons with heart 
conditions was shown to be discriminatory. McCord has met her 
burden of proof by showing that she was terminated from employment, 
the termination was due to her employer's perception of her as 
handicapped, she was otherwise qualified to perform the work (since 
no other reason was given for termination at the time it became 
effective), and her employer made no attempt or inquiry regarding 
possible accommodations. Her employer did not even seek to obtain 
medical advice about the perceived handicap — its symptoms, 
treatment or how it would affect McCord's job performance — before 
making the immediate decision to terminate. 
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Maverik asserts that McCord failed to meet her burden because 
she is not handicapped, and argues the very limited medical 
evidence in support of this position. The Administrative Law Judge 
concedes that McCord's condition of mitral valve prolapse in this 
instance does not appear to present any impairment to McCord's 
ability to perform her job. Nevertheless, the law is clearly aimed 
at both actual and perceived handicaps. This is a case where 
Manager Jones' perception of handicap (based on Jones' emotional 
and unsubstantiated analogy to her own family situation — not on 
any medical evidence) was discriminatory in itself. 
Maverik also urges the Commission to find that "convenience 
store clerking is not a substantial life activity," Respondent's 
Closing Brief, p. 6, and therefore, discrimination cannot be found. 
Maverik's counsel misses the point of the anti-discrimination laws 
and regulations. Mc Cord testified that she pursued permanent 
employment with Maverik as a means of supporting herself and her 
son. It would be absurd for the Commission to engage in an 
analysis of which types of employment are "career" or "non-career," 
as Respondent argues. "Employment" is clearly listed as a category 
in the litany of "major life activities" set forth by Rule, and 
McCord's employment was terminated. 
Maverik asserts that McCord's performance problems were the 
actual reason for termination. This is not supported by the 
evidence. Manager Jones alone made the decision to terminate 
McCord's employment. The best evidence of her basis for this 
decision is the contemporaneous document she prepared at the time, 
Exhibit A-4, Record of Employee Counseling, and the reasons she 
gave McCord in the termination discussion. Both state the reason 
as McCord's heart problem, and Jones' non-medical perception that 
it was related to job stress. Subsequently, Jones has stated that 
factors such as pump reading problems, general nervousness, and 
possible drinking contributed to the decision to terminate. Since 
none of these was discussed with McCord or documented by Jones 
prior to termination and this claim being filed, such suggestions 
lack credibility. Further, McCord had only worked at Maverik for 
two weeks prior to termination, and there is no indication that 
these factors had led Jones to consider termination or even 
discipline, until the heart condition became known. 
Finally, Maverik claims that McCord is not otherwise qualified 
to perform the job. McCord was presumably performing the job up 
until the moment she asked for the time to go to the hospital, and 
her qualifications had not been questioned at that point. At 
termination her performance was rated by Jones as "average." For 
Maverik to suggest in hindsight that McCord's qualifications were 
lacking begs the question. 
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McCord has suffered damages as a result of Maverik's 
prohibited employment practice, in that she has been deprived of 
wages and benefits of employment. Utah law states that if an 
employer is found to have engaged in a prohibited discriminatory 
practice, the Commission shall "issue an order requiring the 
respondent to cease any discrimination or prohibited employment 
practice and to provide relief to the complaining party, including 
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorney's fees," U.C.A. 
34-35-7.1(9). 
Awards of back pay are governed by federal law, 42 U.S.C 
2000e-5, and the purpose thereof is to make the party whole for 
injuries suffered through discrimination. In this case, back pay 
is calculated at a rate of $3.35 per hour for 24 hours per week, or 
$80.40 per week. The period of back pay runs from the date of 
termination through the date of this Order. While McCord argues 
for the use of incremental raises, based on those received by 
another employee, the Administrative Law Judge does not find that 
probative in McCord's case. The evidence is too speculative to 
establish that McCord would have, in fact, qualified for these 
incremental raises by passing the tests required. The 
Administrative Law Judge does incorporate by reference the 
increases in federal minimum wage, effective April 1, 1990 to $3.80 
per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour, for 
purposes of calculating the back pay award (Exhibit A-12.) 
Respondent asks the Commission to terminate McCord's back pay 
award as of the date she secured employment as a janitor for Ashley 
Elementary School in November, 1988. This employment lasted only 
two months. A review of pertinent case law demonstrates that 
victims of discrimination do have a duty to mitigate their back pay 
damages by actively seeking other suitable employment, and "Interim 
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the 
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the 
back pay otherwise allowable," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). Therefore, 
McCord's back pay award must be reduced by all earnings from 
interim employment, including Ashley Elementary School. 
However, the Ashley Elementary employment does not toll the 
period of back pay since McCord's employment there was not 
terminated voluntarily. Consistent with case law enunciated in 
Bradv v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269 (1985), "the 
[back pay] period is tolled when the quit is motivated by personal 
reasons unrelated to the job or as a matter of personal 
convenience," Id. at 1278. Since McCord was required to quit 
Ashley Elementary due to illness beyond her control, that period of 
employment should operate as an offset only against the back pay 
award. 
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McCord argues that front pay ought to be awarded in lieu of 
reinstatement with Maverik Country Stores, due to the hostility 
shown McCord by Jones and other employees during the pendency of 
these proceedings* The Administrative Law Judge finds that 
reinstatement is still an appropriate remedy, given the fact that 
Jones no longer works for Maverik, substantial time has passed 
since these incidents and presumably, reinstatement could be 
arranged in another Maverik location or capacity• 
McCord is entitled to the value of employment benefits she has 
lost as a result of the discriminatory termination. No proof was 
introduced of the specific Maverik benefit programs to which McCord 
could have been entitled, and therefore, none can be awarded based 
on the evidence in the record. 
The parties reserved the question of an appropriate attorney's 
fees award, pending this Order, and shall address that in 
supplemental briefs to the Commission. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores is found 
liable of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice in the 
nature of handicap discrimination against Vicky Ann McCord, and 
that Maverik Country Stores cease any discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practices immediately; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores provide full 
relief to Vicky Ann McCord, including reinstatement to employment 
in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with full 
rights, privileges and protections of employment; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay to Vicky 
Ann McCord back pay, at the rates specified above, from the date of 
unlawful termination until the date of this Order, subject to all 
lawful offsets due to interim employment; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take such 
affirmative action as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from 
its environment any employment discrimination prohibited by law; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores not 
retaliate against Vicky Ann McCord for having exercised her right 
to file this action; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee to counsel for Vicky Ann McCord, subject 
to both parties submitting written legal briefs on this question to 
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the Commission; McCord/s counsel shall submit his brief on 
attorney/s fees on or before twenty days from the date of this 
Order; Maverik's counsel shall submit a response brief, if emy, on 
attorney's fees on or before twenty days thereafter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take any 
other applicable and reasonable relief as may be necessary to 
restore Vicky Ann McCord to her rightful position. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
2^&W day of (Jfr.t^J 1 9 9 1 • 
ATTEST: 
f^tur^^ ^P 7] <&7* I-
Patricia O. A'shb^  
Commission Secretary 
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VICKY ANN MCCORD, * 
* 
Charging Party, * 
v s . * 
* 
MAVERIK COU1JTRY STORE, * 
Respondent. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On June 26, 1991, an Order was issued in the above case, 
finding that Maverik Country Store illegally discriminated against 
Vicky Ann McCord on the basis of a perceived handicap. The parties 
were granted additional time to submit legal briefs on the amount 
of legal fees to be awarded to the prevailing party, pursuant to 
U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(9). Said briefs and supporting affidavits have 
been received and reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge, who now 
enters the following Supplemental Order on the sole issue of 
attorney's fees. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Charging Party's counsel has made application for $25,400.50 
in attorney's fees and $1,536.26 in costs in connection with the 
prosecution of this claim. The attorney's fees represent the work 
of three attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec and Diane Abbeglen, 
at the hourly rates of $125, $80 and $80, respectively. The costs 
involve mailing, transcribing, witness costs, phone calls, computer 
time and copying. 
Respondent opposes the award of the attorney's fees as 
claimed, and alleges that the fees are overstated and 
unconscionable. They note that the entire damage award to Ms. 
McCord was only in the range of $8,000, and the fee claimed far 
exceeds that amount. 
The Administrative Law Judge has carefully reviewed the 
pleadings on this issue, and has considered the circumstances of 
the case itself, which she heard on behalf of the Commission. She 
has also reviewed Utah cases which provide guidance on the award of 
attorney's fees, including Travner v. Cushino, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 
1984); Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) and fcixl* 
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The attorney's 
fees in this case are awarded on the basis of U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(9). 
Case law identifies the following key factors to consider In 
awarding attorney's fees: relationship of the fee to the amount 
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recovered, novelty and difficulty of the issues, overall result 
achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate rights, 
Travner, supra, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, customary 
fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved, Cabrera, supra, f,The total amount of attorneys 
fees awarded in [a] case cannot be said to be unreasonable just 
because it is greater than the amount recovered on the contract," 
Cabrera at 625. 
This was a relatively straightforward claim of handicap 
discrimination, which required a one-day administrative hearing. 
No pre-trial proceedings or pleadings were required. Very limited 
discovery was conducted, and the majority of the work for the 
attorneys on both sides consisted of preparation for, and 
attendance at, the actual hearing. It was necessary for Charging 
Party to initiate a formal proceeding to vindicate her rights, 
since the Respondent had not acknowledged its liability under the 
"cause" finding of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division. The 
overall result obtained by Charging Party's counsel was successful, 
and the hourly rate billed by counsel was within the customary 
range for the Salt Lake City legal community. Charging Party's 
counsel was knowledgeable and competent in the area of employment 
discrimination law. 
However, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was a lack 
of efficiency in presenting the case, and the number of hours spent 
on particular pleadings was excessive. A disproportionately large 
block of Charging Party's attorneys' time was spent preparing 
written closing arguments, and later, preparing the brief on 
attorney's fees. 
This is regrettable, due to the fact that the Administrative 
Law Judge customarily hears only oral closing arguments, but herein 
made an accommodation to the parties' request and allowed vritten 
closing arguments. Parties in an administrative hearing are 
expected to come to the hearing prepared to make both opening and 
closing statements orally at the hearing. Certainly it was not 
envisioned that allowing a written, instead of oral, presentation 
would increase the Charging Party's total legal costs by a factor 
of nearly one-third. Moreover, such charges defeat the purpose of 
handling discrimination claims in an administrative forua, where 
judicial economy is a priority. 
The Administrative Law Judge suspects that both parties could 
not resist the urge to ralitigate the hearing itself by submitting 
extensive written closing arguments. This is very understandable 
in light of both attorneys' conduct during the eight-hour hearing, 
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in which objections and arguments continually interrupted the flow 
of testimony, and there was a notable lack of cooperation between 
counsel on even the smallest evidentiary matters. The 
Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that those circumstances left 
the impression that perhaps the hearing testimony needed to be re-
presented in written, summary form, and then re-argued as part of 
closing arguments. Unfortunately, this process required 34.10 
hours of Mr. Stewart's time, and 3 6.75 hours of Ms. Krivanec's 
time, according to the fee affidavits submitted. That expenditure 
of time approaches the amount of hours spent in hearing preparation 
itself, and is found to be excessive. 
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party's 
counsel in connection with the written closing arguments are 
partially disallowed as follows: of the 34.10 hours spent by Mr. 
Stewart on closing arguments, two-thirds (23 hours) are disallowed; 
of the 3 6.75 hours spent by Ms. Krivanec on closing arguments, two-
thirds (24 hours) are disallowed. This leaves Mr. Stewart with 
106.10 total compensable hours and Ms. Krivanec with 64.40 total 
compensable hours. 
The balance of the attorney's fees claimed include substantial 
time for preparation of the pleadings on the attorney's fee issue 
itself: 37.05 hours of Ms. Abbeglen's time at $80.00/hour «= 
$2,960.00. As can be seen from the hearing transcript, the 
Administrative Law Judge was very interested in handling the 
attorney's fees issue in the simplest and least costly manner. She 
asked the parties if they could stipulate to merely submitting 
attorney's fees affidavits following her ruling, and not requiring 
a further hearing on that single issue. The parties so agreed, and 
again, it was not envisioned that by doing so, nearly $3,000 would 
be spent on the preparation of those affidavits. (Respondent's 
counsel matched this lack of restraint by filing two separate legal 
briefs contesting the award.) Claims of attorney's fees are 
routine and commonly done by large firms such as Charging Party's 
counsel. It should not require more than a few hours of organizing 
and tabulating bills. The affidavits from other attorneys in 
similar practices are superfluous in an administrative forum, and 
are not necessary unless specifically requested by the ALJ. 
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party'• 
counsel in connection with the legal fees claim are partially 
disallowed as follows: of the 37.05 hours spent by Ms. Abbeglen on 
the legal fees claim, two-thirds (25 hours) are disallowed, leaving 
16.45 total compensable hours. 
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The remainder of Charging Party's legal fees are specificall 
found to be reasonable and supported by the evidence, and ar 
awarded to Charging Party as a matter of statutory legal right 
The costs have been examined closely and all appear to be relate 
to the prosecution of this claim- They are not excessive and ver 
reasonably necessary for case preparation; therefore, they will b 
awarded as claimed. 
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge rejects the argumen 
that Charging Party's fee is unreasonable because it far exceed 
the damage award. Damage awards in employment cases are strictl; 
limited to lost wages/benefits, and it is not reasonable to expec 
that Charging Party's counsel could have prepared and litigate* 
this case for some fraction of a few thousand dollars. This i« 
especially true in this case, where Respondent's counsel assertec 
many frivolous arguments unsupported by tenets of discriminatioi 
law. The principles at stake in a discrimination case render ii 
more valuable to a Charging Party than a mere dollar figure, ant 
attorneys' fees may exceed the actual damages in many employment 
cases. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The attorney's fees claim submitted by Charging Party's 
counsel is reasonable and supported by the evidence, with the 
exception of two-thirds of the hours spent on written closinc 
arguments and two-thirds of the hours spent on legal fees 
affidavits and briefs. Following such deductions, Respondent shal] 
be liable for Charging Party's attorney's fees and costs, pursuant 
to U.C.A. 35-34-7.1(9). 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Kaverik Country Store, 
pay the legal fees of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, ir 
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before this 
Commission, in the amount of $19,731.00. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent, Kaverik Country Store, 
pay the legal costs of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, in 
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before thii 
Commission, in the amount of §1,536.26. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be fil#d in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
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date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors a-
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and n< 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Lav Judge 
Certified on this /fl-frO day of (^+"£1^*^) * 1991. 
ATTEST: 
P a t r i c i a O. Ashby ( f~ 
CoiuiTiission Secre tary-
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presiding officer on the motion to set aside the 
default 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the 
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun 
by a party that has other parties besides the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after 
issuing the order of default, conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudica-
tive proceeding without the participation of the 
party in default and shall determine all issues in 
the adjudicative proceeding, including those af-
fecting the defaulting party 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no 
parties other than the agency and the party in 
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding 1968 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit par-
ties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review 
of an order b> the agency or by a superior agency, 
the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review within 30 days after the issuance of 
the order with the person or entity designated for 
that purpose by the statute or rule 
<b> The request shall 
(D be signed by the party seeking review, 
(n) state the grounds for review and the 
relief requested, 
(in) state the date upon which it was 
mailed and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
and to each partv 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the re-
quest for review, or within the time period provided 
by agenc> rule whichever is longer an> party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute 
or rule to receive the response One copy of the re-
sponse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and 
to the presiding officer 
»31 If a statute or the agency s rules require review 
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the 
agency or superior agency shall review the order 
within a reasonable time or within the time required 
by statute or the agency's rules 
(41 To assist in review, the agency or superior 
agencv may by order or rule permit the parties to file 
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to 
all parties 
<6i ta> Within a reasonable time after the filing of 
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
within the time required by statute or applicable 
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
written order on review 
(b) The order on review shall be 6igned by the 
agency head or by a person designated by the 
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party 
(c) The order on review shall contain 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule per-
mitting or requiring review, 
(n) a statement of the issues reviewed, 
(in > findings of fact as to each of the issues 
reviewed, 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the 
issues reviewed, 
(v) the reasons for the disposition, 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency 16 to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion 
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re-
manded, 
(vn) a notice of any right of further ad-
ministrative reconsideration or judicial re-
view available to aggrieved parties, and 
(vin) the time limits applicable to any ap-
peal or review isse 
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 day6 after the date that an order 
is issued for which review by the agency or b\ a 
supenor agency under Section 63-46b-12 is un-
available, and if the order would otherwise con-
stitute final agency action, any party may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute the 
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek-
ing judicial review of the order 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed 
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to 
each party by the person making the request 
(3) (a) The agency head or a person designated for 
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting 
the request or denying the request 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated 
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20 
days after the filing of the request the request 
for reconsideration shall be considered to be de 
nied i»88 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by statute 
(2 > A party may seek judicial review onl\ after ex-
hausting all administrative remedies available ex-
cept that 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required, 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or 
all administrative remedies if 
d) the administrative remedies are made 
quate, or 
(n) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex-
haustion 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b 13<3nb) 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter ims 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by tnal de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except that the juvenile court shall have 
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating 
to removal or placement decisions regarding chil-
dren in state custody 
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presiding officer on the motion to set aside the 
default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the 
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun 
by a party that has other parties besides the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after 
issuing the order of default, conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudica-
tive proceeding without the participation of the 
party in default and shall determine all issues in 
the adjudicative proceeding, including those af-
fecting the defaulting party 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no 
parties other than the agency and the party in 
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding lsee 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1J (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit par-
ties to an> adjudicative proceeding to seek reviev* 
of an order b> the agency or by a superior agency, 
the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review within 30 days after the issuance of 
the order with the person or entity designated for 
that purpose by the statute or rule 
(b> The request shall 
(I) be signed by the party seeking review, 
(II) state the grounds for review and the 
relief requested, 
(III) state the date upon which it was 
mailed, and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
and to each part\ 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the re-
quest for reviev*. or within the time period provided 
bv agenc> rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute 
or rule to receive the response One copy of the re-
sponse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and 
to the presiding officer 
<31 If a statute or the agency's rules require review 
of an order b> the agency or a superior agency, the 
agenc> or superior agency shall review the order 
within a reasonable time or within the time required 
bv statute or the agency's rules 
(4> To assist in review, the agency or superior 
agenc\ ma> by order or rule permit the parties to file 
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to 
all parties 
(6) ia> Within a reasonable time after the filing of 
an\ response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
within the time required by statute or applicable 
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
written order on review 
(b) The order on review shall be 6igned by the 
agency head or by a person designated by the 
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party 
(c) The order on review shall contain 
(I) a designation of the statute or rule per-
mitting or requiring review, 
(II) a statement of the issues reviewed, 
(113 > findings of fact as to each of the issues 
reviewed, 
(iv) conclusions of law a6 to each of the 
issues reviewed, 
(v) the reasons for the disposition, 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency 16 to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion 
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re-
manded, 
(vn) a notice of any right of further ad-
ministrative reconsideration or judicial re-
view available to aggrieved parties, and 
(vi»> the time limits applicable to any ap-
peal or review. ises 
63-46b-I3. Agency review — Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order 
is issued for which review by the agency or b\ a 
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is un-
available, and if the order would otherwise con-
stitute final agency action, any party may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested 
(b) Unless otherwise provided b\ statute the 
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek-
ing judicial review of the order 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed 
with the agenc> and one copy shall be sent b\ mail to 
each party by the person making the request 
(3) (a) The agency head or a person designated for 
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting 
the request or denying the request 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated 
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20 
days after the filing of the request the request 
for reconsideration shall be considered to be de-
nied 1988 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. 
( D A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited b> statute 
(2> A party ma> seek judicial review onl> after ex-
hausting all administrative remedies available ex-
cept that 
(a) a party seeking judicial review, need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required, 
(b) the court may relieve a part> seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust an> or 
all administrative remedies if 
(I) the administrative remedies are inade-
quate, or 
(II) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex-
haustion 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13'3)(b) 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
thus chapter 10a* 
63-4€b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by tnal de novo all final agencv actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except that the juvenile court shall have 
jurisdiction over all state agencv actions relating 
to removal or placement decisions regarding chil-
dren in state custody 
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include 
(1) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review, 
(n) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency, 
(m) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or bnef description of 
the agency action, 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action, 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding, 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review 
(vn) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested, 
(vin) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed b> the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 
(3) (a) The district court without a jurv, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and an> 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section iwo 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record, 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record 
d) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record, or 
(n) according to any other provision of 
law 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basi6 of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied, 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute, 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution, 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law, 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure, 
(0 the persons taking the agenc> action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification, 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi 
nation of fact, made or implied b> the agenc>, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court, 
(h) the agency action is 
d) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute 
(n) contrary to a rule of the agency, 
(m) contrary to the agency s prior prac-
tice unless the agenc\ justifies the inconsis-
tency b> giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious 1966 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica 
tive proceedings by the district court or the re 
view of formal adjudicative proceedings b> an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or 
compensation only to the extent expressh autho-
rized by statute 
(b) In granting relief, the court mav 
d) order agenc\ action required b> law 
(n) order the agencv to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law 
(in) set aside or modify agenc\ action, 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action, or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable b> a higher court, 
if authorized by statute 1987 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a sta> of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency 8 
order of demal shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that 
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counsel of record or by a party who is not represented 
by counsel 
Rule 22. Computation and enlargement of time. 
(a) Computation of time. In computing any pe-
riod of time prescribed by these rules, by an order of 
the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the 
act, event, or default from which the designated pe-
riod of time begins to run shall not be included The 
last day of the period shall be included, unless it is a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which 
event the period extends until the end of the next day 
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday 
When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less 
than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, 
and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computa-
tion As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes 
days designated as holidays by the state or federal 
governments 
(b) Enlargement of time. The court for good cause 
shown ma) upon motion enlarge the time prescribed 
b\ these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may 
permit an act to be done after the expiration of such 
time, but the court may not enlarge the time for filing 
a notice of appeal or a petition for review from an 
order of an administrative agency, except as specifi-
cally authorized by la* A motion for an enlargement 
of time shall be filed prior to the expiration of the 
time for which the enlargement is sought A motion 
for enlargement of time shall 
(1) State with particularity the reasons for 
granting the motion, 
(2) State whether the movant has previously 
been granted an enlargement of time and, if so, 
the number and duration of such enlargements, 
(3) State when the time will expire for doing 
the act for which the enlargement of time is 
sought, and 
(4) State the date on which the act for which 
the enlargement of time is sought will be com-
pleted 
(c) Ex parte motion. Except as to enlargements of 
time for filing and service of briefs under Rule 26(a), 
a part> may file one ex parte motion for enlargement 
of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of 
time has been previously granted, if the time has not 
alread} expired for doing the act for which the en-
largement is sought, and if the motion otherwise com-
plies with the requirements and limitations of para-
graph (b> of this rule 
id) Additional time after service by mail. 
Whenever a party is required or permitted to do an 
act within a prescribed period after service of a paper 
and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added 
to the prescribed period 
Rule 23. Motions. 
*a> Content of motion; response; reply. Unless 
another form is elsewhere prescribed by these rules, 
an application for an order or other relief shall be 
made by filing a motion for such order or relief with 
proof of service on all other parties The motion shall 
contain or be accompanied by the following 
(DA specific and clear statement of the relief 
sought, 
(2) A particular statement of the factual 
grounds, 
(3) If the motion is for other than an enlarge-
ment of time, a memorandum of points and au-
thorities in support, and 
(4) Affidavits and papers, where appropriate 
Any party may file a response in opposition to a 
motion within 10 day6 after service of the motion, 
however, the court may, for good cause shown, dis-
pense with, shorten or extend the time for responding 
to any motion 
(b) Determination of motions for procedural 
orders. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 
(a) of this rule as to motions generally, motions for 
procedural orders which do not substantially affect 
the rights of the parties or the ultimate disposition of 
the appeal, including any motion under Rule 22(b), 
may be acted upon at any time, without awaiting a 
response Pursuant to rule or order of the court, mo-
tions for specified types of procedural orders may be 
disposed of by the clerk The court may review a dis-
position by the clerk upon motion of a party or upon 
its own motion 
(c) Power of a single justice or judge to enter-
tain motions. In addition to the authority expressly 
conferred by these rules or by law, a single justice or 
judge of the court may entertain and may grant or 
deny any request for relief which under these rules 
may properly be sought by motion, except that a sin-
gle justice or judge may not dismiss or otherwise de-
termine an appeal or other proceeding, and except 
that the court may provide by order or rule that anv 
motion or class of motions must be acted upon by the 
court The action of a single justice or judge ma\ be 
reviewed by the court 
(d) Form of papers; number of copies. 
(1) Except for motions to enlarge time, five 
copies shall be filed with the original m the Su-
preme Court, and four copies shall be filed with 
the original in the Court of Appeals, but the 
court may require that additional copies be fur-
nished Only the original of a motion to enlarge 
time shall be filed 
(2) Motions and other papers shall be type-
written on opaque, unglazed paper 8' 2 b\ 11 
inches in size The text shall be in type not 
smaller than ten characters per inch Lines of 
text shall be double spaced and shall be upon one 
side of the paper only Consecutive sheets shall 
be attached at the upper left margin 
(3) A motion or other paper shall contain a 
caption setting forth the name of the court, the 
title of the case, the docket number, and a brief 
descriptive title indicating the purpose of the pa-
per The attorney shall sign all papers filed with 
the court with his or her individual name The 
attorney shall give his or hei business address, 
telephone number, and Utah State Bar number 
m the upper left hand corner of the first page of 
every paper filed with the court except briefs A 
party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
sign any paper filed with the court and state the 
party's address and telephone number 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appel-
lant shall contain under appropriate headings and in 
the order indicated 
(DA complete list of all parties to the proceed-
ing in the court or agency whose judgment or 
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the 
caption of the case on appeal contains the names 
of all such parties The list should be set out on a 
separate page which appears immediately inside 
the cover 
(2) A table of contents, with page references 
(3) A table of authonties with cases alphabeti-
cally arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
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statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the bnef where they are 
cited 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction 
of the appellate court 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for re-
view and the standard of appellate review for 
each issue with supporting authority for each is-
sue 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordi-
nances, rules, and regulations whose interpreta-
tion is determinative shall be set out verbatim 
with the appropriate citation If the pertinent 
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone 
will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall 
be set forth as provided in paragraph (0 of this 
rule 
(7) A statement of the case The statement 
6hall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in 
the court below A statement of the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review shall follow 
All statements of fact and references to the pro-
ceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record (see paragraph (e)) 
(8) Summary of arguments The summary of 
arguments suitably paragraphed shall be a suc-
cinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged 
(9) An argument The argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise re-
lief sought 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee 
shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of 
this rule, except that a statement of the issues or of . 
the case need not be made unless the appellee is dis- * 
satisfied with the statement of the appellant 
(c* Reply brief. The appellant may file a bnef in 
reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee 
has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues 
presented by the cross-appeal Reply briefs shall be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the 
opposing brief No further briefs may be filed except 
with leave of the appellate court 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will 
be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep . 
to a minimum references to parties by such designa-
tions as "appellant" and "appellee" It promotes clar-
ity to use the designations used in the lower court or 
in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of 
parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," 
"the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc 
(e) References in briefs to the record. Refer* 
ences shall be made to the pages of the original record 
as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of the 
reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of 
the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement pre-
pared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g) References to 
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers If reference is 
made to evidence the admissibility of which is in con-
 m 
troversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the 
transcript at which the evidence was identified, of 
fered, and received or rejected 
(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules, 
(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision, 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or order per 
taming to the issues on appeal and any jur> ID 
structions or other part of the record of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal 
shall be reproduced in the bnef or in an adden 
dum to the brief 
(2) If determination of the issues presented re-
quires the study of statutes, rules, regulations 
etc , or relevant parts thereof to the extent not 
set forth under subparagraph (a)(6> of this rule 
they shall be reproduced in the brief or m an 
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to 
the court in pamphlet form 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the 
court, pnncipal bnefs shall not exceed 50 pages and 
reply bnefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of cita 
tions and any addendum containing statutes rules 
regulations, or portions of the record as required b\ 
paragraph (f) of this rule 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals If a 
cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of 
appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes 
of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise 
agree or the court otherwise orders The brief of the 
appellee shall contain the issues and arguments in 
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to 
the bnef of the appellant 
d) Briefs in cases involving multiple appe) 
lants or appellees. In cases involving more than one 
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join 
in a single brief, and am appellant or appellee ma\ 
adopt b> reference any part of the brief of another 
Parties ma> similarly join in reply briefs 
0) Citation of supplemental authorities When 
pertinent and significant authorities come to the at 
tention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision a 
party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court An onginal letter and seven copies shall be 
filed in the Court of Appeals There shall be a refer 
ence either to the page of the bnef or to a point ar 
gued orally to which the citations pertain but the 
letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations Any response shall be 
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarl) 
limited 
(k) Requirements and sanctions All bnefs un 
der this rule must be concise, presented with accu 
racy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant immatenal or 
scandalous matters Briefs which are not in compli 
ance may be disregarded or stncken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court ma\ assess attor 
ney fees against the offending lawyer 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of 
heavy cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27 
Rule 25. Bnef of an amicus curiae or guardian 
ad litem. 
A bnef of an amicus cunae or of a guardian ad 
litem representing a minor who is not a party to the 
appeal may be filed only if accompanied by written 
consent of all parties, or by leave of court granted on 
motion or at the request of the court A motion for 
leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and 
shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
runae or the suardian ad litem is desirable Except 
